Advisers Act

Surviving Election Season: Refresher on Pay-to-Play Rules for Investment Advisers

Election season is already in full swing. As a result, investment advisers may wish to increase their attention to applicable pay-to-play compliance obligations, as further described herein.

I. Background on the Rule

In connection with political contributions, registered investment advisers, certain exempt reporting advisers and foreign private advisers (collectively referred to herein as “advisers”),1 as well as their “covered associates”2 (which is broadly defined), are subject to Rule 206(4)-5 of the Advisers Act, otherwise known as the “pay-to-play” rule. The purpose of the rule is to curtail “pay-to-play” practices by advisers seeking to manage the assets of state and local governments (e.g., public pension funds and investments by public universities) in return for political contributions. The SEC does not have to show any intent or quid pro quo to allege a violation of this anti-fraud rule. Penalties imposed by the SEC in connection with violations of the rule are severe even for foot-faults. Such penalties generally include disgorgement of any advisory fees received from such governmental entities, as well as the imposition by the SEC of civil monetary penalties (which are regularly in the hundreds of thousands of dollars).3

II. Prohibitions

     A. Ban on Fees Following Contributions

As a general matter, the rule prohibits advisers and their covered associates from making political “contributions”4 to any “official”5 of a “government entity”6 who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate for an elective office of a government entity if that office could influence the hiring of an investment adviser for such entity or have authority to appoint a person who could have such influence. If such a political contribution is made, the adviser is prohibited from receiving any compensation from advisory services to that government entity for two years thereafter – otherwise known as the “time-out” period. The adviser can still provide uncompensated advisory services to such entity during the time-out period, or provide uncompensated advisory services until the entity locates a replacement adviser. Note that an adviser to a “covered investment pool”7 in which a government entity invests or is solicited to invest shall be treated as though that adviser was providing or seeking to provide investment advisory services directly to the entity.

     B. Ban on Using Third Parties to Solicit Government Business

The rule further prohibits an adviser from providing payment8 to (or agreeing to pay), directly or indirectly, any person to solicit9 a government entity for advisory services on behalf of the adviser. However, such solicitation is not prohibited if the person is a (1) “regulated person”10 (such as a registered investment adviser, broker-dealer or municipal adviser) or an (2) executive officer, general partner, managing member, similar person or employee of the adviser. The rule also prohibits an adviser from coordinating or soliciting a person or PAC to: (1) contribute to an official of a government entity to which the adviser provides or seeks to provide advisory services or (2) make a payment to a political party of a state or locality in which the adviser provides or seeks to provide advisory services to a government entity.

     C. Catchall Ban

As a sort of catchall provision, the rule prohibits any acts done indirectly which, if done directly, would violate the rule. For example, the SEC staff has indicated that while a covered associate’s contribution to a PAC generally would not trigger the two-year time-out, if the contribution is earmarked or known to be provided for the benefit of a particular political official, it would implicate the catchall provision because the covered associate would be doing indirectly what it could not do directly.11

III. Exceptions and Exemptions from the Rule

     A. Exception for Certain New Covered Associates

Whereas the rule requires a two-year look-back for all covered associates who solicit clients, it only requires a six-month look-back for “new” covered associates who do not solicit clients. The “look-back” period will follow covered associates that change advisers, such that a prohibited contribution by a covered associate will result in a “time out” for the covered associate’s new firm for the remainder of the two-year or six-month period, depending on whether the covered associate solicits clients for the new firm. To prevent advisers from channeling contributions through departing covered persons, if a covered person makes a prohibited contribution and then leaves the employ of that adviser, the former adviser will also still be subject to the two-year time-out period, despite the departure of the covered associate who made the contribution.

     B. De Minimis Exception

The primary exception to the pay-to-play rule is the de minimis exception. The de minimis exception allows an adviser’s covered associate that is a natural person to contribute: (1) up to $350 to an official per election (with primary and general elections counting separately) if the covered associate is entitled to vote for the official at the time of the contribution; and (2) up to $150 to an official per election (with primary and general elections counting separately) if the covered associate is not entitled to vote for the official at the time of the contribution. Most firms implement pre-clearance requirements in connection with covered person political contributions in order to ensure compliance with this exception. Any contribution above such de minimis amounts, no matter how small, can trigger a violation of the rule.

     C. Returned Contribution Exception

If a covered associate makes a contribution that triggers the two-year time-out period solely because he or she was not entitled to vote for the official at the time of the contribution, the adviser can undo the contribution under very narrow circumstances. To be eligible for the returned contribution exception, the contribution had to be less than $350, the adviser must have discovered the contribution within four months of the date of such contribution, and the adviser must cause the contributor to re-collect the contribution within 60 days after the adviser discovers the contribution. However, an adviser can only rely on the returned contribution exception on limited occasions (for advisers with fewer than 50 employees, twice in a 12-month period; for advisers with more than 50 employees, three times in a 12-month period), and an adviser can never use the returned contribution exception for the same covered associate twice. Again, this exception is only applicable if the violation is discovered and remedied on a timely basis.

     D. Request for Exemptive Relief

In extremely narrow circumstances, the rule also allows an adviser to apply for an order exempting it from the two-year time­out requirement in the event of an inadvertent violation that falls outside of the exceptions set forth above. The SEC will grant orders only when, according to the SEC, the imposition of the time-out provision is unnecessary to achieve the rule’s intended purpose.12 Advisers applying for an order must do so through an application process that exposes the firm and the covered associate to public scrutiny.

IV. Recordkeeping Requirements

As part of their recordkeeping requirements under the pay-to-play rule, advisers must collect and maintain:

  • the names, titles and business and residence addresses of all covered associates;
  • all government entities to which the adviser provides or has provided investment advisory services, or which have been investors in any covered investment pool to which the adviser provides or has provided investment advisory services, in the last five years;
  • all direct and indirect contributions made by the adviser or its covered associates to an official of a government entity or direct or indirect payments made to a political party or PAC; and
  • the name and business address of each regulated person to which the adviser agrees to provide direct or indirect payment to solicit a government entity.

V. Summary

If an investment adviser would like to remain eligible to bid for government contracts, it should take affirmative steps to ensure that the firm and its covered persons do not violate the pay-to-play rule. Robust pay-to-play policies and procedures, as well as pre-clearance of political contributions, are recommended best practices for advisers that seek government clients. Re-education of adviser personnel and covered associates as to the requirements of the rule, especially in light of the upcoming election season, is also advised.13 An adviser should also consider pre-screening new covered person candidates for the applicability of the rule. Finally, it may be helpful to conduct periodic checks of campaign contribution databases, as well as require quarterly pay-to-play compliance reporting. The SEC may bring enforcement actions for even minor foot-fault violations of the rule. Such cases generally result in disgorgement and fines. Compliance with the relevant recordkeeping obligations is also important, as the SEC regularly reviews pay-to-play recordkeeping as part of adviser exams.

The rule applies to all investment advisers registered (or required to be registered) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or unregistered in reliance on the exemption available under section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) (15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)(3)), or that is an exempt reporting adviser, as defined in section 275.204-4(a) – which includes venture capital fund advisers and private fund advisers.

A “covered associate” broadly includes (1) a general partner, managing member, executive officer or other individual with a similar status or function; (2) any employee who solicits a governmental entity for the adviser (and any person who supervises, directly or indirectly, such an employee); or (3) a political action committee (PAC) controlled by the adviser or by any of its covered associates.

3 See e.g., In the Matter of Ancora Advisors LLC, SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-18937 (Dec. 18. 2018), found here.

4 The definition of “contribution” is broad and encompasses any gift, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or anything of value made for (1) the purpose of influencing any election for federal, state or local office; (2) payment of debt incurred in connection with any such election; or (3) transition or inaugural expenses of the successful candidate for state or local office.

5 An “official” means any person (including any election committee for the person) who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate for elective office of a government entity, if the office: (1) is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an adviser by a government entity; or (2) has authority to appoint any person who is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an investment adviser by a government entity.

A “government entity” means any state or a political subdivision of a state, including: (1) any agency, authority or instrumentality of the state or a political subdivision, (2) a pool of assets sponsored or established by the state or political subdivision or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, including, but not limited to a “defined benefit plan” as defined in section 414(j) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. 414(j)), or a state general fund; (3) a plan or program of a government entity; and (4) officers, agents, or employees of the state or political subdivision or any agency, authority or instrumentality thereof, acting in their official capacity.

7 “Covered investment pool” means: (1) an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act) that is an investment option of a plan or program of a government entity; or (2) any company that would be an investment company under section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act, but for the exclusion provided from that definition by either section 3(c)(1), 3(c)(7) or 3(c)(11) of that Act.

8  “Payment” means any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value.

9  “Solicit” means: (1) with respect to investment advisory services, to communicate, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of obtaining or retaining a client for, or referring a client to, an adviser; and (2) with respect to a contribution or payment, to communicate, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of obtaining or arranging a contribution or payment.

10 “Regulated person” means: (1) a registered investment adviser that has not (and whose covered persons have not) made, coordinated or solicited a contribution within the last two years that would violate the rule; (2) a broker-dealer that is a member of a registered national securities association, so long as such association’s rules prohibit members from engaging in distribution or solicitation activities after making political contributions and the SEC finds, by order, that such rules are at least substantially equivalent to the restrictions imposed on advisers under the rule; and (3) municipal advisors registered under section 15B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and subject to pay to play rules adopted by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), provided that the MSRB rules: A) impose substantially equivalent or more stringent restrictions on municipal advisors than the pay to play rule imposes on investment advisers and B) are consistent with the objectives of the pay to play rule.

11 Staff Responses to Questions about the Pay to Play Rule.

12 The rule outlines a number of factors that the SEC will consider, including an assessment of the adviser’s compliance environment, the nature of the contribution and the covered associate’s intent in making the contribution. Since the rule’s adoption, the SEC has granted 16 exemptive orders. See e.g. In the Matter of D.B. Fitzpatrick & Co., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5496 (May 5, 2020) (order), found here; D.B. Fitzpatrick & Co., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5475 (Apr. 9, 2020) (notice of application), found here; In the Matter of D.B. Fitzpatrick & Co., Inc., File No. 803-253 (Apr. 9, 2020) (application), found here.

13 For example, even though the rule applies to advisers seeking to influence state and local entities and not federal entities, if a state office holder that has influence over the selection of investment advisers, which could include a sitting state governor, were to be nominated as a Vice Presidential running mate, contributions to that ticket could implicate the rule.

Nicole Kalajian
Aliza Dominey
Sara Crovitz

Lessons from the SEC’s Private Fund Adviser Risk Alert: Conflicts of Interest and the Importance of Disclosure

On June 23, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) published a Risk Alert discussing three general areas of deficiencies identified by OCIE staff in recent examinations of hedge fund and private equity managers: (1) conflicts of interest, (2) fees and expenses and (3) policies and procedures relating to material non-public information. This note will focus on certain observations from OCIE with respect to conflicts of interest and the related lessons in terms of investor disclosure, which are rooted in the concept of “informed consent,” as discussed in the SEC’s June 2019 Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers (the 2019 Release).

While the Risk Alert describes deficiencies observed in examinations of registered investment advisers, the fiduciary duty and anti-fraud provisions cited by OCIE[1] apply equally to “exempt reporting advisers.” As such, below are selected topics from the Risk Alert for private fund advisers to consider in reviewing conflicts of interest-related disclosure provided to investors.

Allocation of Investments. OCIE staff raised concerns about private fund advisers’ inadequate disclosure with respect to allocation of investment opportunities among various clients, including flagship funds, co-investment vehicles, separately managed accounts (SMAs), and employee or partner vehicles. The SEC has previously noted, in the 2019 Release, that an adviser “need not have pro rata allocation policies, or any particular method of allocation…” Further, “[a]n adviser and a client may even agree [emphasis added] that certain investment opportunities or categories of investment opportunities will not be allocated or offered to a client.” In the Risk Alert, however, OCIE staff described instances of allocations in inequitable amounts among clients “without providing adequate disclosure about the allocation process…thereby causing certain investors…not to receive their equitable allocations of such investments.”

Preferential Liquidity Terms. The Risk Alert described conflicts related to preferential liquidity rights granted to certain investors in side letters, as well as conflicts related to advisers that had set up SMAs that invest alongside flagship funds without providing sufficient disclosure to fund investors of the SMAs’ preferential liquidity terms. In OCIE’s view, such advisers’ “[f]ailure to disclose these special terms adequately meant that some investors were unaware of the potential harm that could be caused by selected investors redeeming their investments ahead of other investors, particularly in times of market dislocation where there is a greater likelihood of a financial impact.”

Seed and other Strategic Investors. In addition, OCIE highlighted seed investor arrangements and other economic relationships between advisers and certain fund investors as another area of insufficient transparency, noting that “[f]ailure to provide adequate disclosure about these arrangements meant that other investors did not have important information related to conflicts associated with their investments.”

Co-Investment Opportunities. With respect to co-investments, OCIE cited observations of private fund advisers with inadequate disclosure regarding agreements to provide preferential access to such opportunities to a subset of investors. As such, those investors may not have understood “the scale of co-investments and in what manner co-investment opportunities would be allocated among investors.” There were also failures to follow disclosed policies in allocating investments, including between flagship funds and dedicated co-investment vehicles.

[1] The Risk Alert cites an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (Advisers Act), as well as advisers’ obligations under Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-8, which is an anti-fraud provision aimed specifically at protecting pooled investment vehicles and their investors.

Misleading Marketing Materials: SEC Enforcement Lessons for Hedge Fund and Private Equity Firms

In two recent enforcement actions involving a hedge fund manager and a private equity sponsor, the SEC found violations of the Investments Advisers Act as a result of misleading information provided to investors in private fund marketing presentations.

In the Matter of Everest Capital LLC and Marko Dimitrijevic (April 30, 2020): Everest Capital Global Fund (the Fund), a hedge fund with AUM of $830 million at peak, was liquidated following losses sustained in January 2015 after shorting the Swiss Franc, which rose more than 30% in one day. While the SEC’s press release describes “misconduct relating to risk management,” the enforcement action is framed as a disclosure violation resulting from misleading information provided to investors in the Fund’s marketing materials.

  • Gross Exposure: Gross exposure numbers in Fund marketing presentations carved out currency positions without disclosing this fact. As a result, the Fund’s gross exposure was represented as ranging between 155 – 185% during the relevant period, when in fact it was over 1300%.
  • Concentration Limits: In addition, the marketing materials provided that the Fund “would not take concentrated positions in any single geographic region,” highlighting the lessons learned by Everest’s portfolio manager from taking concentrated bets on Russian investments in 1998. In fact, the Fund’s gross exposure to the Swiss Franc alone ranged from 400 – 900% during the relevant period.
  • Risk Management: The Fund’s marketing materials also described the ability of Everest’s risk team “to reduce risk independent of the investment team,” but in fact the risk team had no such authority with respect to the Fund’s currency positions. On this point, the SEC further points to the Fund’s offering memorandum, which “did not exclude currencies from the [firm’s] ‘extensive research and risk management.’”

In the Matter of Old Ironsides Energy, LLC (April 17, 2020): The Old Ironsides team formerly made energy investments for a Fortune 100 company and spun out in 2013 to become an independent energy private equity firm, with AUM of approximately $1.75 billion.  The firm was fined $1 million for mischaracterizing an investment in the team’s legacy portfolio, which formed part of the track record included in marketing materials distributed to investors.

  • In calculating the firm’s track record included in marketing materials distributed to potential investors in Old Ironsides Energy Fund II LP (Fund II), the firm described a large, profitable legacy investment made in 2002 as a direct oil and gas investment. In fact it was an investment in another private fund managed by a third party over whose investment decisions the team had only certain voting rights, along with other investors in that fund.
  • By including that private fund investment as a direct investment (specifically categorized as “early stage”), the firm improved the legacy portfolio’s track record in such investments, which would be one of three investment types on which Fund II would focus. Further, the SEC highlights that Fund II’s mandate expressly excluded investments in other private funds.

Upcoming Webcast – The SEC’s Proposed Amendments to the Advisers Act Advertising Rule

Please join Fiduciary Governance Group’s Larry Stadulis and Sara Crovitz, along with Les Abromovitz from Foreside, and Mary Beth Constantino from Fidelity Investments, for a one hour webinar to discuss the SEC’s recent proposed amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Advertising Rule.

Thursday, February 13, 2020
1:00 PM – 2:00 PM EST

Discussion Topics:
• The Advertising Rule in Its Current Form
• Proposed Amendments
• Difficulties with the Proposals
• Possible Solutions

Register for the webinar here.

It’s true, ESG is a ‘compliance minefield’

Sometimes, our friends in the press come up with a headline that simply cannot be topped. Yesterday, Ignites published an article called, “Going Green: Shops Work to Navigate ESG Compliance Minefield.” The article opens appropriately, noting that while ESG funds “may be all the rage with investors […] shops that fail to think carefully about their investment methodologies and related disclosures could end up in the SEC’s hot seat.” Indeed, though, the SEC is certainly not the only regulator to keep a close eye on ESG products and mandates. In the United States, the Department of Labor also has ESG on its radar. ESG is also a hot topic for numerous regulators and legislatures globally. What are some of they important compliance challenges?

  1. Are fund descriptions, registration statements and disclosures accurate? If ESG factors are considered as part of the fund’s strategy, do such documents reflect that reality correctly?
  2. If the firm has publicly committed to engage in certain conduct (e.g., shareholder engagement, etc.) by reason of membership in a particular group or alliance (e.g., UN PRI, Climate Action 100+, etc.), is the firm following through on its promises?
  3. Are global legal developments considered, recognizing that Europe, North America and Asia are at different stages of ESG statutory and regulatory promulgation?
  4. Have proxy voting policies been considered in light of SEC and DOL guidance?
  5. Does the investment management agreement explicitly require (or prohibit) the investment manager to vote proxies or exercise other shareholder rights on behalf of an ERISA plan?
  6. Are the investment manager and asset owner on the same page in terms of which ESG strategy will be pursued?
  7. Does the investment policy statement or investment guidelines specify which E, S or G factor is part of the investment mandate?
  8. Has the investment manager considered potential conflicts of interest of proxy adviser firms?
  9. If the client is a governmental plan, has the investment manager diligenced the applicable state statutes and constitutional provisions to confirm that implementation of the mandate complies with applicable law?
  10. Is disclosure in due diligence questionnaires accurate and factually supportable?


SEC Proposes to Modernize the Advertising and Cash Solicitation Fee Rules for Investment Advisers

On November 4, 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to its investment adviser advertising and cash solicitation fee rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”), as well as related amendments to its investment adviser books and records rule and registration form (collectively, the “Proposals”).1  Specifically, the Proposals seek to amend Rule 206(4)-1, which governs how a registered investment adviser can market its products and services (the “Advertising Rule”); Rule 206(4)-3, which regulates an adviser’s cash solicitation fee arrangements (the “Solicitor Rule”); Rule 204-2, which sets forth an adviser’s books and records and obligations (the “Books and Records Rule”); and Form ADV, the adviser registration and disclosure form.

The current Advertising Rule and Solicitor Rule have remained largely unchanged since their adoption in 1961 and 1979, respectively. The SEC states in its release containing the Proposals (the “Proposing Release”) that they are principally designed to bring the rules and disclosure form up to speed with current industry practices and technological advancements.

This alert provides an overview of the Proposals and discusses how an investment adviser’s existing regulatory obligations pertaining to advertising and the payment of cash solicitation fees would be altered if the Proposals are adopted. Part I discusses the proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule, and Part II discusses the proposed amendments to the Solicitor Rule.

The proposed amendments relating to the Advertising Rule are numerous and substantive, and go well beyond mere updates. They would include the following:

  • Significantly expand the definition of “advertisement” to include online communications, third-party communications disseminated “by or on behalf of” an adviser, and private fund marketing materials.
  • Permit the use of client testimonials, non-client endorsements and third-party ratings, subject to certain enumerated conditions.
  • Impose substantive conditions on advertisements that present actual or hypothetical investment performance (including model, target and projected performance).
  • In certain instances, such as the presentation of gross-of-fee investment performance, impose regulatory conditions on advertisements distributed to retail investors that are more extensive than those provided solely to non-retail investors.
  • Require a designated employee of an adviser to review and approve each advertisement, other than certain excluded communications, prior to distribution.

The proposed amendments to the Solicitor Rule are also significant, and would include the following:

  • Encompass non-cash compensation arrangements.
  • Apply to private fund investor solicitation arrangements.
  • Eliminate the current requirement that the solicitor provide a copy of the adviser’s Form ADV Part 2A to solicited prospects.
  • Ease the solicitor’s brochure delivery requirement in connection with certain mass solicitations.
  • Revise and expand the list of disciplinary events that disqualify a solicitor from receiving compensation.

Part I – Proposed Amendments to the Advertising Rule

The Advertising Rule currently prohibits all investment advisers registered, or required to be registered, with the SEC from distributing, directly or indirectly, advertisements that contain any of the following:

  1. Testimonials of any kind concerning the adviser’s advisory services;
  2. Past specific recommendations of an investment adviser that were or would have been profitable;
  3. Charts and graphs to help investors decide which securities to buy or sell, without prominently disclosing the limitations of such material;
  4. Offers to provide reports or services free of charge unless such reports or services are actually free; and
  5. Untrue statements of material fact, or otherwise false or misleading statements of material fact.

The proposed amendments would restructure and expand the Advertising Rule to five main subsections: (1) definitions; (2) general prohibitions; (3) testimonials, endorsements and third-party ratings; (4) performance information; and (5) review and approval. A brief overview of each subsection follows.


The definitions subsection would define key terms used throughout the Advertising Rule. Without a doubt, the most important of these terms is “advertisement.” The proposed amendments would substantially expand the scope of this defined term to include the following types of communications that promote an adviser’s investment advisory services to prospective and existing customers: oral communications; online communications; communications to a single person; communications to private fund investors; and communications by or on behalf of an adviser. By focusing this definition on the goal of the communication, not the method of delivery, the SEC expects the proposed definition to be flexible enough to keep pace with advancing technology and evolving industry practices.

The Proposing Release indicates that the inclusion of private fund communications was intended to supplement and enhance the prohibitions from making misleading statements to private fund investors under Rule 206(4)-8.2 Thus, private fund communications would be subject to both the Advertising Rule and Rule 206(4)-8.

The expanded definition of advertisement would include not only communications that an adviser disseminates, but also communications that some other party distributes “by or on behalf” of the adviser. The Advertising Rule would not expressly define this phrase, but the Proposing Release indicates that it would encompass adviser-authorized communications made by intermediaries, such as consultants and solicitors, as well as adviser affiliates. The Proposing Release also discusses in some detail the circumstances under which communications by unaffiliated third-parties could be considered by or on behalf of an adviser.3

The proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule would expressly exclude the following four types of communications from the definition of advertisement: (1) non-broadcast live oral communications; (2) communications responding to unsolicited requests for information about the adviser or its services, other than communications to retail persons, including performance results or communications to anyone that include hypothetical performance; (3) an advertisement about a registered investment company or public business development company that is within the scope of Rule 482 or Rule 156 under the Securities Act of 1933; and (4) any information required to be contained in a regulatory notice, filing or other communication.

General Prohibitions

The proposed general prohibitions subsection of the Advertising Rule contains an expanded and enhanced list of general advertising prohibitions. Violations of these provisions can rest on a finding of mere negligence; proof of scienter would still not be required. This subsection includes the following new prohibitions:

  1. Unsubstantiated claims. Unsubstantiated material claims or statements, such as exaggerated statements about an adviser’s skill or experience. This prohibition is designed to prohibit the same conduct currently prohibited regarding the use of charts and graphs in advertisements, but is broader in scope to prevent other misleading advertisements, such as guaranteed returns and unsubstantiated statements about an adviser’s skill or experience.
  2. Untrue or misleading implications or inferences. This prohibition is aimed at advertisements that are likely to cause misleading inferences to be drawn by an investor regarding some material fact about the adviser. The Proposing Release notes examples of advertisements that could present a true statement of fact in materially misleading ways.4  For instance, it would be misleading for an advertisement to include a single investor testimonial stating that an investor’s account was profitable, which may be factually true, if the investor’s results were atypical among all the adviser’s investors.
  3. Failing to disclose risks and limitations. Failing to clearly and prominently disclose any material risks or other limitations when advertising the benefits of an adviser’s services. The proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule do not specifically address the circumstances under which disclosures will be deemed “clear and prominent” for purposes of this prohibition. The SEC does state in the Proposing Release, however, that what is considered clear and prominent may vary by type of advertising medium. However, merely including a hyperlink to risks within an online advertisement would not be sufficient.
  4. Cherry-picking. Referencing specific investment advice that is not presented in a fair and balanced manner. This provision is principally concerned with an adviser “cherry-picking” and presenting in a misleading manner favorable aspects of its investment advice, including but not limited to past and current profitable securities recommendations. The SEC states in the Proposing Release that what is “fair and balanced” will depend on the specific facts and circumstances.

It is important to note that these general prohibitions are in addition to the proposed amendments, discussed below, relating to testimonials, endorsements, third-party ratings and performance results. Thus, for example, an advertisement containing a testimonial satisfying the proposed testimonial-related provisions of the Advertising Rule would still violate the Advertising Rule if it violated one or more of the general prohibitions discussed above.

Testimonials, Endorsements and Third-Party Ratings in Advertisements

The proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule would permit the use of testimonials, which are currently prohibited, and permit non-client endorsements and third-party ratings, which are not addressed by the current rule. The proposed definitions of “testimonials” and “endorsements” are broad and capture all advertisements containing any direct or indirect approval, support, recommendation or experience by clients or investors in connection with an adviser’s advisory services. Third-party ratings are defined in the proposed Advertising Rule as ratings provided by a non-related person who provides such ratings in the ordinary course of business. The Proposing Release states that the ordinary course of business requirement is intended to relate to persons with experience developing and promoting ratings, and would distinguish third-party ratings from testimonials and endorsements.5

Under the proposed amendments, advertisements containing testimonials, endorsements or third-party ratings must satisfy certain disclosure and other conditions intended to alert recipients to any relationship with the adviser, compensation received by the author and related conflicts of interest. As a result, for testimonials and endorsements, a disclosure must be provided as to who provided the recommendation and whether such person was compensated for the recommendation (including non-cash compensation). Third-party ratings must be accompanied by prominent disclosure of the date the rating was made, the period of time the rating is based upon, and the party who is providing the rating. Although the Proposing Release indicates that third-party statements or ratings hosted on third-party platforms generally will fall outside the scope of the Advertising Rule, the Proposing Release cautions that such a determination requires an analysis of the facts and circumstances.6  To use third-party ratings, the adviser must also reasonably believe that the questionnaire used to generate the rating makes it equally easy to provide positive and negative ratings and was not prepared to solicit certain results.

Testimonials, endorsements and third-party ratings that are not themselves “advertisements” or appear within an advertisement will not be subject to the Advertising Rule. However, if the adviser takes steps to influence reviewers or commentary, such as preparing, editing, prioritizing or paying for the content, then this would bring the materials under the scope of the Advertising Rule because such content would be “by or on behalf of” the adviser.

Performance Information 

The performance information subsection identifies six types of performance information that advisers may include in their advertisements: (1) net performance; (2) gross performance; (3) related performance; (4) extracted performance and (5) hypothetical performance. It also sets forth the specific conditions that must be met depending on the type of performance that is presented and the nature of the audience. In this connection, the subsection distinguishes between non-retail advertisements and retail advertisements. A “non-retail advertisement” is defined, essentially, as any advertisement that is disseminated solely to a “qualified purchaser,” as defined in Section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”), or a “knowledgeable employee,” as defined in Rule 3c-5 under the 1940 Act. A “retail advertisement” is any advertisement that is not a non-retail advertisement. An adviser that seeks to publish a “non-retail advertisement” will be required to adopt and implement policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure dissemination only to qualified purchasers and knowledgeable employees. The adviser must also periodically review the adequacy of this policy.

Each type of performance information that advisers would be permitted to include in their advertisements, and the applicable conditions that must be met, are briefly discussed below.

  1. Net Performance. “Net performance” would be defined as the performance results of an account or portfolio after the deduction of all fees and expenses that a client or investor has paid or would have paid an adviser for its investment advisory services. While no particular methodology is prescribed for calculating net performance, the proposed rule contains a list of recommended fees and expenses to be considered, such as direct advisory fees, advisory fees paid to underlying investment vehicles, and payments by the investment adviser for which the client or investor reimburses the investment adviser.The proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule would, effectively, require all retail advertisements containing performance information to include net performance. The net performance would have to be presented for one-, five- and ten-year periods, each with equal prominence and ending on the most recent practicable date. This net performance presentation requirement essentially codifies the SEC staff’s long-standing position in Clover Capital Management, Inc. (Oct. 28, 1986). Significantly, this requirement would not apply to non-retail advertisements, including those for private funds excluded under Section 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act.
  2. Gross Performance. “Gross performance” is defined as the performance results of an account or portfolio that is presented before the deduction of all fees and expenses charged for the provision of investment advisory services. The proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule would require all advertisements containing gross performance to provide or offer to provide promptly a schedule of the specific fees and expenses (presented in percentage terms) deducted to calculate net performance. Retail advertisements could not include gross performance unless equally prominent net performance accompanies it. The accompanying gross performance must be calculated over the same time period as the net performance using the same methodology.
  3. Related Performance. “Related performance” would be defined as the performance results of one or more portfolios with substantially similar investment policies, objectives and strategies as those of the services being offered or promoted in the advertisement. The proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule would prohibit the presentation of related performance in an advertisement without including all portfolios with substantially similar investment policies, objectives and strategies, unless the advertised performance is no higher than if all related portfolios had been included. Such requirements seek to prevent an adviser from selectively excluding poor performing portfolios that are similarly managed. The adviser also cannot exclude performance information if such exclusion would alter the Proposals’ prescribed time periods. The adviser would be permitted to present related performance information on a portfolio-by-portfolio basis or as composites. It should be noted that the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) does not currently allow related performance to be included in advertisements to retail investors.
  4. Extracted Performance. “Extracted performance,” which is also often referred to as carveout performance, would be defined as the performance results of a subset of investments extracted from a portfolio. The proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule would prohibit the presentation of extracted performance, unless the advertisement provides or offers to provide promptly the performance results of all investments in the portfolio from which the performance was extracted.
  5. Hypothetical Performance. Finally, “hypothetical performance” would be defined as performance results that were not actually achieved by any portfolio of any client of the investment adviser. This defined term would include, but not be limited to, the following: (1) performance derived from representative model portfolios that are managed contemporaneously alongside portfolios managed for actual clients; (2) backtested performance; and (3) targeted or projected performance. Since hypothetical performance is perceived as carrying a higher risk of being misleading, if an adviser decides to provide hypothetical performance, it must adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that such information is disseminated only to persons for which it is relevant to their financial situation and investment objectives. Sufficient information must also be provided so that the recipient can understand the criteria and assumptions in calculating the performance, as well as the risks and limitations of such performance information (although only an offer to provide such information promptly is required in the case of a non-retail investor). Note that FINRA currently prohibits hypothetical backtested performance in “retail communications,” as that term is defined in Conduct Rule 2210.

The Proposals also provide guidance with regard to the portability of performance. For instance, where an adviser wishes to use the performance results in its advertisement from a predecessor firm or from personnel that have joined the adviser from a different firm, it must disclose that the predecessor performance was achieved by a different firm or by personnel from a different firm to make the advertisement not misleading. In addition, an advertisement may be misleading if the personnel that joined the adviser were not primarily responsible for the predecessor performance. While an adviser must maintain books and records required to substantiate performance, the SEC recognized that documentation related to predecessor performance may be unavailable to an adviser, and asked for comment as to whether the rule should permit other forms of verification (e.g., using publicly available contemporaneous information).

Review and Approval of Advertisements

Except as noted below, the proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule would require that an advertisement be reviewed, approved and determined to be in compliance with the Advertising Rule by a designated employee of the adviser before the advertisement could be disseminated. The Proposing Release indicates that the designated reviewer should be competent and knowledgeable, and the SEC expects that the designated employee should generally include legal or compliance personnel of the adviser. The proposed Advertising Rule would not permit the designated reviewer to be an outside third-party, such as a compliance consultant or law firm, but the Proposing Release asks for comment on this limitation.

Preapproval would not be required, however, for the following two types of communications:

  • Communications to individual persons. Communications to a single person, household or private fund investor would not require preapproval. However, an adviser cannot seek to utilize this exemption by customizing a template presentation or mass mailing and then simply filling in different investor names or other basic client details; and
  • Live oral communications. Live oral communications that are broadcast over television, the internet or other similar media would not require preapproval. However, if a live communication is recorded, then approval would be required prior to a distribution.

Books and Records

The Proposals would amend the Books and Records Rule in light of the proposed amendments to the Advertising Rule. Thus, among other things, the Books and Records Rule would be amended to require an adviser to make and keep copies of all communications sent to one or more persons. Currently, this requirement applies only to communications sent to 10 or more persons. In addition, it would require an adviser to maintain copies off all third-party questionnaires and surveys used to create third-party ratings. Finally, an adviser would be required to keep and maintain those records necessary to demonstrate the calculations of the various types of performance information discussed above, such as hypothetical performance.

Amendment to Form ADV

The Proposals would amend Form ADV to require an adviser to report additional information about its advertising activities. Specifically, five new “yes/no” questions would be added to Part 1A of Form ADV, which would request information about an adviser’s use of advertisements that contain performance results, testimonials, endorsements, third-party ratings and its previous investment advice. The SEC would use this information to help prepare for examinations of advisers.

Advertising Rule’s Harmonization With Other Regulators

While the proposed amendments would bring investment advisers closer in line with the principles-based advertising regime of other regulators, such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) and the National Futures Association (the “NFA”), an adviser that is also registered as a commodity pool operator and/or commodity trading advisor should note that compliance with the amended adviser advertising rule, as proposed, may not satisfy its obligations under similar CFTC and NFA rules. The proposed Advertising Rule is also different from the obligations imposed on broker dealers by FINRA, which may create compliance challenges for dual-registrants and broker dealers seeking to advertise pooled investment vehicles.

Part II – Proposed Amendments to the Solicitor Rule

The existing Solicitor Rule sets forth the conditions under which a registered investment adviser may compensate related and unrelated third-party solicitors for prospective client referrals. The rule prohibits cash payments to persons subject to certain specified legal and disciplinary actions (“Disqualifying Events”). The term “solicitor” is defined broadly to include “any person who, directly or indirectly, solicits any client for, or refers any client to, an investment adviser.”

All solicitor arrangements currently must be memorialized in a written agreement between the adviser and solicitor (the “Solicitor Agreement”). The Solicitor Agreement must obligate any solicitor, other than one who is an officer, director, employee or control affiliate of the adviser, to provide each client prospect, at the time of solicitation, with a copy of the adviser’s Form ADV, Part 2A (the “Adviser Brochure”) and a separate written disclosure document concerning the solicitor arrangement (the “Solicitor Disclosure”). The Solicitor Disclosure must contain specified types of information about the arrangement, including the name of the solicitor, the name of the adviser, the nature of the relationship between the parties and the terms of compensation. Finally, the adviser must receive from the client prospect, prior to, or at the time of, entering into any advisory contract, a signed and dated acknowledgment of receipt of the Adviser Brochure and Solicitor Disclosure.

The Proposals would amend the Solicitor Rule in several important areas, briefly discussed below.

Definition of Solicitor 

The proposed amendments to the Solicitor Rule would expand the definition of “solicitor” to also include any person who solicits prospective or existing private fund investors, as opposed to only advisory clients. Although not addressed directly in the proposed amendments, the Proposing Release also discusses the circumstances under which a person receiving compensation for providing testimonials or endorsements in an adviser’s advertisements would be deemed a solicitor. The Proposing Release further notes that, depending on the facts and circumstances, a solicitor may also meet the Advisers Act’s definition of “investment adviser,” and, therefore, have to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act, absent an available exemption from registration.

Permissible Compensation 

The Solicitor Rule would be expanded to cover solicitation arrangements involving all forms of compensation rather than only cash compensation. Non-cash compensation would include, but not be limited to, directed brokerage; sales awards or other prizes; training or education meetings; outings, tours or other forms of entertainment; and free or discounted advisory services. The Proposing Release states that compensation “could also include the adviser providing investment advice that directly or indirectly benefits the solicitor.” For example, if the solicitor is a broker-dealer or affiliated with a broker-dealer, an adviser’s payment for solicitation could be the adviser’s recommendation that its investors purchase the solicitor’s proprietary investment products or products that the adviser knows have revenue sharing or other pecuniary arrangements with the solicitor or its affiliates.

Solicitor Agreement

The proposed amendments to the Solicitor Rule would alter the requirements relating to the Solicitor Agreement in certain key respects. Specifically, an adviser would no longer be required to enter into a Solicitor Agreement with its officers, directors, employees and control affiliates (“Solicitor Affiliates”), provided that (1) the Solicitor Affiliate’s affiliation with the adviser is readily apparent and (2) the adviser documents the Solicitor Affiliate’s status at the time it enters into the solicitation arrangement (“Solicitor Affiliate Conditions”).

In addition, the solicitor would no longer be required to deliver the Adviser Brochure under the terms of the Solicitor Agreement. The Solicitor Disclosure would still need to be delivered at the time of solicitation, except in connection with solicitations made through mass communications, where delivery must be made as soon as reasonably practicable. Either the adviser or the solicitor could agree to deliver the Solicitor Disclosure under the terms of the Solicitor Agreement.

The information that must be contained in the Solicitor Disclosure would largely remain the same, with two exceptions. First, the Solicitor Disclosure would have to disclose any potential material conflicts of interest on the part of the solicitor resulting from the investment adviser’s relationship with the solicitor and/or the compensation arrangement. Second, it would have to disclose the amount of any additional cost to the investor as a result of solicitation.

Adviser Oversight of Solicitor 

An adviser would be required to have a reasonable basis for believing that the solicitor has complied with the terms of the Solicitor Agreement. Whether an adviser satisfies this “reasonable basis” requirement would depend on the circumstances. The SEC states in the Proposing Release, however, that “a reasonable basis generally should involve periodically making inquiries of a sample of investors referred by the solicitor in order to ascertain whether the solicitor has made improper representations or has otherwise violated” the Solicitor Agreement. The proposed amendments would omit Solicitor Affiliates from this solicitor oversight requirement, provided that the Solicitor Affiliate Conditions are met.

Disqualifying Events

The proposed amendments to the Solicitor Rule would revise the provisions relating to Disqualifying Events. Specifically, they would reorganize the list of Disqualifying Events and add certain new legal and disciplinary proceedings to this list. In addition, an adviser would be required to exercise reasonable care in determining that a solicitor is not subject to a Disqualifying Event and thus prohibited from receiving compensation. This reasonable care standard would continue to apply throughout the term of the solicitation arrangement. It is important to note that the Disqualifying Event provisions would continue to apply to Solicitor Affiliates. Moreover, the proposed amendments would provide a conditional exemption from the Disqualifying Event provisions for certain SEC administrative actions, including proceedings under Section 9(c) of the 1940 Act and those proceedings that are not, themselves, Disqualifying Events.


The proposed amendments would exempt from the Solicitor Rule certain charitable programs and arrangements under which a solicitor has received $100 or less in compensation over the preceding 12 months.

Books and Records

The proposed amendments to the Solicitation Rule would be accompanied by corresponding amendments to the Books and Records Rule to require investment advisers to make and keep records of (1) copies of the Solicitor Disclosure delivered to investors, (2) any communication or other document related to the investment adviser’s determination that it has reasonable basis for believing that any solicitor it compensates under the Solicitor Rule has complied with the Solicitor Agreement, and that such solicitor is not an ineligible solicitor and (3) a record of the names of all solicitors who are an adviser’s partners, officers, directors or employees, or other affiliates.

Existing SEC Staff Guidance

The Proposing Release notes that various no-action letters and other guidance addressing the application of the advertising and solicitation rules issued by the staff of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management (the “Division”) are under review for withdrawal (or for withdrawal with respect to a certain topic) in connection with the potential adoption of the amendments. More than 180 letters have been identified for review (including almost 100 “bad actor” letters issued under the Solicitor Rule). A number of notable letters are also specifically discussed in the Proposing Release.7  The SEC has requested that interested parties identify additional letters for potential withdraw.

Public Comment Period

The public comment period will remain open for 60 days following publication of the Proposing Release in the Federal Register. The Division has recently been focused on expanding the views considered in the rulemaking comment process, and asset managers and industry participants of all sizes are encouraged to comment on the Proposal.8 The SEC is also soliciting information from investors about the Proposals via Appendix B of the Proposing Release, titled “Investor Feedback.”

The SEC indicated that, should the Proposals be adopted, advisers and their solicitors would have one year to comply with the new rules.


1 Investment Adviser Advertisements; Compensation for Solicitations, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-5407 (Nov. 4, 2019).
2 See Proposing Release, p. 35 (noting there may be some overlap between the prohibition in Rule 206(4)-8 and the proposed Advertising Rule).
3 See Proposing Release, pp. 24-28.
4 See Proposing Release, pp. 57-59.
5 See Proposing Release, pp. 80-81.
6 See Proposing Release, p. 81.
7 See, e.g., Investment Adviser Association, SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 2, 2005); TCW Group, SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 7, 2008); Investment Counsel Association of America, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 1, 2004); Horizon Asset Management, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 13, 1996); Munder Capital Management, SEC No-Action Letter (May 17, 1996); Clover Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 28, 1986).
8 Comments can be submitted via the SEC’s internet comment form (available at or by sending an email to rule-comments@sec.govwith “File Number S7-21-19” in the subject line.

New SEC Proposal May Complicate Proxy Voting & Engagement by Advisers

At an open meeting on November 5, 2019, a majority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) voted to recommend two proposals amending the federal proxy rules.1Commissioners Robert Jackson Jr. and Allison Herren Lee opposed these proposals.2 The first proposal conditions reliance on certain existing exemptions under the proxy rules by proxy voting advice businesses such as Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis, upon compliance with additional conflicts disclosure and procedural requirements, including permitting issuers to review and provide responses to proxy businesses’ reports.3 The second proposal would amend the proxy rules applicable to the submission of shareholder proposals, including enhanced eligibility requirements and more onerous resubmission limits. The components of each of these two proposals are summarized below. Comments on the proposals are due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

I. Amendments to Exemptions From the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice

The first proposal would amend the proxy rules applicable to companies that regularly provide proxy voting advice to asset managers and others (“proxy businesses”), such as ISS and Glass Lewis. The proposed amendments would (1) clarify that proxy businesses’ voting advice constitutes a solicitation, (2) require additional conflict disclosure in voting advice, (3) provide issuers up to two opportunities to review the proxy advice before it is delivered to clients, (4) provide issuers the opportunity to require in the advice that is delivered to clients a hyperlink to the issuer’s views on that advice and (5) enumerate specific examples of what may constitute misleading statements by proxy businesses. The proposed amendments would increase costs for proxy businesses and may shorten the amount of time asset manager clients have to review proxy advice prior to the vote.

  • Definition of “Solicitation.” The SEC’s proposal would amend the definition of “solicitation” under Rule 14a-1(l) and Section 14(a) to include any proxy voting advice that makes a recommendation to a shareholder as to its vote, consent or authorization on a specific matter for which shareholder approval is solicited and that is furnished by a person who markets such advice separately from other forms of investment advice and sells such advice for a fee.4 This definition encompasses voting recommendations promulgated under proxy businesses’ benchmark voting policies or sets of guidelines. The SEC emphasized that the definition of solicitation should continue to be construed broadly. However, the SEC clarified that it intended that proxy voting advice furnished by a person such as a broker-dealer or an investment adviser made only in response to unprompted client requests would continue to be excluded under the definition.
  • Conflicts of interest disclosures. Proposed Rule 14a-2(b)(9)(i) requires that persons who provide proxy voting advice and rely on the solicitation exemptions in Rules 14a-2(b)(1) or 14a-2(b)(3) provide additional written disclosures about material conflicts of interest in their proxy voting advice to clients.5
  • Timely review and feedback period. Proposed Rule 14a-2(b)(ii), as a condition of relying on exemptive Rules 14a-2(b)(1) and 14a-2(b)(3), would require a standardized opportunity for timely review and feedback by issuers and certain other soliciting persons of proxy voting advice before the advice is disseminated to the proxy business’ clients. This would be required regardless of whether the advice on the matter is adverse to an issuer’s own recommendation, subject to certain conditions.6 The proxy business can condition this receipt of proxy voting advice on the issuer agreeing to keep the contents of the proxy voting advice confidential. The length of time for review and feedback varies depending on how far in advance of the shareholder meeting the issuer has filed a proxy statement (see table below). The proxy business would not be required to accept any suggested revisions. However, in accepting or rejecting any revisions, the proxy business would be subject to Rule 14a-9, which prohibits any materially misleading misstatements or omissions.
  • Final notice of voting advice. In addition to the review and feedback period and as a condition of relying on the exemptions in Rules 14a-2(b)(1) and 14a-2(b)(3), proxy businesses would be required to provide a final notice of voting advice to issuers at least two business days prior to the delivery of the proxy voting advice to their clients. This is required regardless of whether the issuer commented on the version it received during the review and feedback period. This final notice should contain a copy of the proxy voting advice that the proxy business will deliver to its clients, including any revisions to the advice as a result of the review and feedback period. As in the review and feedback period, proxy businesses can condition an issuer’s receipt of the proxy voting advice on the issuer keeping the contents of the proxy voting advice confidential.
  • Hyperlink to issuer’s statement. Under proposed Rule 14a-2(b)(9)(iii), as a condition of relying on the exemptions in Rules 14a-2(b)(1) and 14a-2(b)(3), a proxy business must, upon request, include in its proxy voting advice and in any electronic medium used to deliver the advice a hyperlink (or other analogous electronic medium) that leads to a written statement by the issuer about its views of the proxy business’s voting advice, regardless of whether the advice is consistent with the issuer’s recommendation. Thus, asset managers relying on proxy voting advice could be confronted with conflicting views of facts or analysis in such advice with very little time to evaluate and determine whether such disagreements should impact the asset manager’s decision on how to vote. Notably, the SEC requested comments on whether proxy businesses should be required to disable the automatic submission of votes unless a client clicks on the hyperlink and/or accesses the issuer’s response or otherwise confirms any prepopulated voting choices before the proxy business submits the votes to be counted. Moreover, an asset manager’s determination to vote in accordance with a proxy business recommendation when such recommendation is subject to an issuer written statement could be subject to increased scrutiny.7
  • Anti-fraud provisions. Currently, Rule 14a-9 prohibits any proxy solicitation from containing false or misleading statements or omissions with respect to any material fact. Proposed Rule 14a-9 would elaborate on the current examples of what might constitute misleading information by including failure to disclose information such as the proxy business’s methodology, sources of information and conflicts of interest.

II. Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Rule 14a-8

The second proposal would amend the shareholder proposal process to (1) provide a tiered approach for eligibility, (2) require certain documents when a proposal is submitted by a shareholder representative, (3) require shareholder-proponents to state when they would be able to meet with the issuer with respect to the proposal and (4) clarify that each shareholder may submit one proposal to an issuer for a particular shareholder meeting.

  • Ownership Eligibility Requirements. Currently, Rule 14a-8 requires a shareholder to have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value or 1% of the issuer’s securities for at least one year by the date the proposal is submitted. Under the proposed amendments, a shareholder would be able to submit a Rule 14a-8 proposal if the shareholder satisfies one of the three following continuous ownership requirements.

    Shareholders would not be allowed to aggregate their securities with other shareholders’ securities to meet the minimum ownership thresholds. This tiered approach reflects the SEC majority’s understanding that a shareholder’s long-term investment in an issuer’s securities makes it more likely that a shareholder’s proposal is meaningful to the issuer and not for personal gain.
  • Co-filing/co-sponsoring shareholder proposals. Under the proposed rules, shareholders would be able to continue to co-file or co-sponsor shareholder proposals as a group if each shareholder in the group meets the eligibility requirements.
  • Use of a representative to submit a shareholder proposal. To address issuers’ concerns about whether a shareholder truly supports the proposal submitted on his/her behalf, proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8 would require shareholders who use representatives to submit their proposals or otherwise act on their behalf in connection with the proposal to provide the issuer with written documentation confirming the representative has authority to act on behalf of the shareholder.
  • Shareholder engagement with the issuer. The SEC proposal also would require a statement from each shareholder-proponent that he/she is able to meet with the issuer in person or via teleconference no fewer than 10 calendar days nor more than 30 calendar days after submission of the shareholder proposal. The shareholder would also be required to include contact information, business days and specific times that he/she is available to discuss the proposal with the issuer.
  • One-proposal limit. Rule 14a-8(c) currently provides that each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to an issuer for a shareholders’ meeting. The SEC proposed amendments to address issuer concerns that proponents try to evade the one-proposal limitation, for example, by a shareholder submitting a shareholder proposal in its own name and simultaneously serving as a representative to submit a different proposal on another shareholder’s behalf for consideration at the same meeting.
  • Resubmissions. Currently, under Rule 14a-8(i)(12), an issuer can exclude a proposal if the matter was voted on at least once in the past three years and did not receive at least (i) 3% of the vote if previously voted on once, (ii) 6% of the vote if previously voted on twice or (iii) 10% of the vote if previously voted on three or more times. The proposed amendments to the resubmission thresholds would raise the current resubmission thresholds from 3%, 6% and 10% to 5%, 15% and 25%.8 Shareholders would be allowed to resubmit substantially similar proposals after a three-year “cooling-off” period.
  • “Momentum” requirements. In addition to the proposed amendments to the resubmission thresholds, the SEC proposed to amend Rule 14a-8(i)(12) to allow issuers to exclude proposals dealing with substantially the same subject matter as proposals previously voted on by shareholders three or more times in the preceding five calendar years that would not otherwise be excludable under the proposed 25% threshold if (i) the most recently voted-on proposal received less than a majority of the vote cast and (ii) support declined by 10% or more compared to the immediately preceding shareholder vote on the matter. The proposal stated that the purpose of the amendment is to relieve management and shareholders from repeatedly considering proposals in which shareholder interest has declined.

III. Conclusion

With regard to the first proposal, the SEC would permit a one-year transition period after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. Issuers receiving shareholder proposals for 2020 annual meetings should continue analyzing proposals under existing rules. Interested parties are encouraged to express their views during the 60-day comment period.

The two proposals are part of the SEC’s ongoing work to “enhance the accuracy, transparency and effectiveness of our proxy voting system.”9 The split vote on the proposals, however, reflects the ongoing debate over shareholder engagement. In particular, Commissioners Jackson and Lee expressed concerns that the proposals “shift power away from shareholders and toward management” and limit investors’ ability to “hold corporate insiders accountable.”10


1 Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, Release No. 38-87457 (Nov. 5, 2019); Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Release No. 34-87458 (Nov. 5, 2019).

2 Robert J. Jackson Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Statement on Proposals to Restrict Shareholder Voting (Nov. 5, 2019); Allison Herren Lee, Commissioner, SEC, Statement on Shareholder Rights (Nov. 5, 2019).

3 Rule 14a-2(b)(1) exempts solicitations by persons who do not seek the power to act as proxy for a shareholder and do not have a substantial interest in the subject matter of the communication beyond their interest as a shareholder. Rule 14a-2(b)(3) exempts proxy voting advice furnished by an adviser to any other person with whom the adviser has a business relationship.

4 The SEC’s proposed amendment would codify the definition from its recent proxy interpretation. Commission Interpretation and Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice, Release No. 34-8671 (Aug. 21, 2019). The interpretation is subject to a lawsuit by Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), which argued that proxy voting advice is not a solicitation. In addition, ISS challenged the interpretation on procedural grounds. Complaint, Institutional S’holder Servs. Inc. v. SEC, No. 1:19-cv-03275 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2019).

5 Currently, proxy businesses relying on the exemption under Rule 14a-2(b)(3) provide conflicts of interest disclosures, for example, on their websites. However, in its proposal, the SEC asserted these disclosures may be inadequate because they are often vague or boilerplate.

6 Proxy businesses would not be required to extend the timely review and feedback period or provide the final notice to persons conducting solicitations that are exempt pursuant to Rule 14a-2 or to shareholder-proponents who submit proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8 and whose proposal will be voted upon at the issuer’s upcoming meeting.

7 In particular, the SEC’s recent guidance regarding proxy voting responsibilities of investment advisers includes a statement that for an investment adviser to form a reasonable belief that its voting determinations are in the best interest of the client, it should conduct a reasonable investigation into potential factual errors. Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, Release No. IA-5325 (Aug. 21, 2019).

8 Specifically, Rule 14a-8(i)(12) would provide that a shareholder proposal may be excluded from an issuer’s proxy material if “the proposal addresses substantially the same subject matter as a proposal previously included in the issuer’s proxy materials within the preceding five calendar years, and if the most recent vote occurred within the preceding three calendar years and was: (i) less than 5 percent of the votes cast if previously voted on once; (ii) less than 15 percent of the votes if previously voted on twice; and (iii) less than 25 percent of the votes if previously voted on three times or more.”

9 Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Statement of Chairman Jay Clayton on Proposals to Enhance the Accuracy, Transparency and Effectiveness of Our Proxy Voting System (Nov. 5, 2019).

10 See supra note 2.