The full article can be found here.
Just yesterday, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) released a set of Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) designed to clarify certain aspects of Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2020-02, Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees (PTE 2020-02). The exemption enables investment advice fiduciaries to ERISA plans and IRAs to receive a wide range of compensation (e.g., commissions, 12b-1 fees, revenue sharing, etc.) as a result of the advice without running afoul of the applicable prohibited transaction rules. As described by the DOL, “[t]he exemption offers a compliance option to investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, and insurance companies (financial institutions) and their employees, agents, and representatives (investment professionals) that is broader and more flexible than pre-existing prohibited transaction exemptions.” We summarize some of the key takeaways from the FAQs below:
- PTE 2020-02 is in effect (February 16, 2021). There was some confusion over this due to a memorandum from Ronald Klain, Chief of Staff to the President, regarding a regulatory freeze. The (new) DOL, however, was pleased enough with PTE 2020-02, a Trump-era rulemaking, that it waved it through. The transition period for parties to devise mechanisms to comply with the provisions in the exemption remains in place until December 20, 2021.
- The DOL hinted at further sub-regulatory guidance and/or returning to the fiduciary investment advice regulation. No promises were made or timetables offered.
- The DOL reiterated that a “single, discrete instance of advice to roll over assets from an employee benefit plan to an IRA” would generally not give rise to investment advice under ERISA. But, such communication could constitute investment advice if it were part of an ongoing relationship or the beginning of an intended future ongoing relationship that an individual has with the investment advice provider.
- The DOL reminded the industry that boilerplate, fine print disclaimers that investment advice is not being provided generally won’t cut it. This echoes sentiment the DOL expressed in 2020. However, “[w]ritten statements disclaiming a “mutual” understanding or forbidding reliance on the advice as “a primary basis for investment decisions” may be considered in determining whether a mutual understanding exists, but such statements will not be determinative.” Ultimately, whether there is a “mutual” understanding that investment advice is being provided is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.
- The DOL reiterated that PTE 2020-02 provides relief for rollover recommendations that result in a prohibited transaction, so long as the exemption’s conditions are satisfied.
- Investment professionals and financial institutions can provide investment advice, despite having a financial interest in the transaction, as long as the advice meets the best interest standard. Under this standard, the advice must be based on the interests of the customer, rather than the competing financial interest of the investment professional or financial institution. Investment professionals may receive payments for their advice within this framework.
- Prior to engaging in a transaction under the exemption, a financial institution must give the retirement investor a written description of its material conflicts of interest arising out of the services and any investment recommendation. The disclosure should allow a reasonable person to assess the scope and severity of the financial institution’s and investment professional’s conflicts of interest. The DOL cautioned that the disclosure should be more than simply having the retirement investor “check the box” to confirm that they know of the conflicts.
- Financial institutions and their investment professionals need to consider and document their analysis of why a rollover recommendation is in a retirement investor’s best interest. For recommendations to roll over assets from an employee benefit plan to an IRA, the DOL listed the following “relevant” non-exhaustive factors to consider: (1) the alternatives to a rollover, including leaving the money in the investor’s employer’s plan, if permitted; (2) the fees and expenses associated with both the plan and the IRA; (3) whether the employer pays for some or all of the plan’s administrative expenses; and (4) the different levels of services and investments available under the plan and the IRA. The DOL also elaborated on what other factors would be part of a prudent analysis.
- The DOL reminded financial institutions that they “must take special care in developing and monitoring compensation systems to ensure that their investment professionals satisfy the fundamental obligation to provide advice that is in the retirement investor’s best interest.” With carefully considered compensation structures, financial institutions can avoid structures that a reasonable person would view as creating incentives for investment professionals to place their interests ahead of the interest of the retirement investor. Thus, quotas, bonuses, prizes and performance standards are likely out. On the flip side, a financial institution could provide level compensation for recommendations to invest in assets that fall within reasonably defined investment categories (e.g., mutual funds), and provide heightened supervision as between investment categories (e.g., between mutual funds and fixed annuities), to the extent that it is not possible for the institution to eliminate conflicts of interest between these categories. The DOL also reminded financial institutions that the exemption requires they address and mitigate firm-wide conflicts.
- Unlike the 2016 rulemaking, PTE 2020-02 does not impose contract or warranty requirements on the financial institutions or investment professionals responsible for compliance. Nor does the exemption expand an investors’ ability to enforce their rights in court or create any new legal claims beyond those in Title I of ERISA and the Code.
Financial institutions seeking additional information about their obligations under PTE 2020-02 may consider our initial analysis on PTE 2020-02 and its related rulemaking.
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has reinstated the five-part test for when one becomes a fiduciary to retirement investors (e.g., ERISA plan sponsors, participants, IRA owners, etc.) by reason of giving non-discretionary investment advice. While at first blush the reinstatement seems to offer great relief to various financial institutions that were possibly ensnared under the DOL’s tricky 2016 conflicts of interest rule, private fund sponsors, broker-dealers and investment advisers should proceed with caution. Interpretations by the DOL over the second half of 2020 suggests it will liberally interpret (and enforce) the five-part test for when one becomes an investment advice fiduciary. Tellingly, that the Trump administration opted to expansively interpret the five-part test to the point that it has more than a passing resemblance of the 2016 conflicts of interest rule under the Obama administration suggests that, regardless of which party controls the Executive Branch, the risks of becoming a fiduciary have increased and the opportunities to avoid such status have inexorably winnowed.
Under the test, a person provides “investment advice” if he or she: (1) renders advice to a plan as to the value of securities or other property, or makes recommendations as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property; (2) on a regular basis; (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding; (4) that such advice will be a primary basis for investment decisions; and that (5) the advice will be individualized to the plan. In addition to satisfying the five-part test, a person must also receive a fee or other compensation to be an investment advice fiduciary.
All five conditions of the test must be satisfied, plus the receipt of compensation (direct or indirect), for there to be fiduciary investment advice.
The linchpin is that, in order to be an investment advice fiduciary, the financial institution must receive a direct or indirect fee or other compensation incident to the transaction in which investment advice has been provided, in addition to satisfying the 5-part test. The DOL reiterated its longstanding position that this requirement broadly covers all fees or other compensation incident to the transaction in which the investment advice to the plan has been rendered or will be rendered. This could include, for example, an explicit fee or compensation for the advice that is received by the adviser (or by an affiliate) from any source, as well as any other fee or compensation received from any source in connection with or as a result of, the recommended transaction or service (e.g., commissions, loads, finder’s fees, revenue sharing payments, shareholder servicing fees, marketing or distribution fees, underwriting compensation, payments to firms in return for shelf space, recruitment compensation, gifts and gratuities, and expense reimbursements, etc.).
Condition #1: “renders advice to a plan as to the value of securities or other property, or makes recommendations as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property”
The DOL appears to interpret “securities or other property” broadly to include not only recommendations of specific investments but also any recommendation that would change fees and services that affect the return on investments. This means:
- A recommendation of a specific security or fund would meet this requirement.
- A recommendation of a third-party investment advice provider (likely both non-discretionary discretionary, though this is not clear) would meet this requirement.
- A recommendation of one’s own products or services, which is accompanied by an investment recommendation, such as a recommendation to invest in a particular fund or security, would meet this requirement.1
- A recommendation to switch from one account type to another (e.g., brokerage vs. advisory, commission-based to fee-based) would meet this requirement.
- A recommendation of a third party who provides investment advice for which a referral fee is paid would most likely meet this requirement.
- A recommendation to take a distribution/rollover from a plan into an IRA or from one IRA to another IRA would most likely meet this requirement.2
- A recommendation of an investment strategy/policy or portfolio composition may meet this requirement.
But some communications will not, without more, give rise to a “recommendation” under prong #1. These include:
- Marketing one’s products and services.3
- Investment education, such as information on general financial and investment concepts, (e.g., risk and return, diversification, dollar-cost averaging, compounded return, and tax deferred investment).
- Simply describing the attributes and features of an investment product.
Condition #2: “on a regular basis”
Looks can be deceiving, and that is certainly the case with the “regular basis” requirement. While it would appear to be self-evident, the DOL’s expansive view of this condition should cause service providers to tread carefully. This is because:
- A one-time sales transaction that is a recommendation would be on a “regular basis” if it were deemed part of an existing or future investment advice relationship with the retirement investor or there is otherwise an expectation by the investor that the sales communication is part of an investment advice arrangement.
- An investment recommendation would be on a “regular basis” if it were made on a recurring and non-sporadic basis, and recommendations are expected to continue. Advice need not be provided at fixed intervals to be on a “regular basis.”
- A rollover recommendation to a participant who has previously received investment advice from the financial institution would be on a “regular basis.”
- One-time investment advice to a plan sponsor of an ERISA plan, when the financial institution has provided the plan sponsor investment advice with respect to its other ERISA plans, would be on a “regular basis.”
On the other hand:
- Sporadic or one-off communications are unlikely to be considered on a “regular basis.”
Conditions #3 and #4: “pursuant to a mutual understanding” “that such advice will be a primary basis for investment decisions”
Whether there is a mutual understanding between the parties that communications are—or are not—investment advice turns on the contractual terms and the surrounding facts and circumstances. Here are some markers:
- Does the written agreement expressly provide for investment advice, or does it expressly and clearly disclaim that any investment advice is intended to be provided? The answer to this is not determinative, but it will factor into the position the DOL takes on whether this condition was met for purposes of the 5-part investment advice test.
- Would a Retirement Investor reasonably believe the financial institution was offering fiduciary investment advice based on the financial institution’s marketing and other publicly available materials? Does the financial institution hold itself out as a “trusted adviser”?
The DOL also confirmed that the advice need only be a primary basis, not the primary basis.
Condition #5: “the advice will be individualized to the plan”
The DOL did not elucidate on this requirement in the new rule. A good rule of thumb, however, is that the more individually tailored the communication is to a specific recipient, the more likely the communication will be viewed as a recommendation by the DOL.
Financial institutions, especially those that believe they do not provide investment advice to retirement investors, should carefully consider whether the DOL’s expansive view of these requirements alters their status as a fiduciary so that they do not inadvertently cause a non-exempt prohibited transaction. An accompanying class exemption goes into effect on February 16, 2021 and would be available for those who become investment advice fiduciaries
1 It is crucial to note that the DOL’s 2016 conflicts of interest rule included an exception for incidental advice provided in connection with counterparty transactions with a plan fiduciary with financial expertise. As the DOL noted then, “[t]he premise… was that both sides of such transactions understand that they are acting at arm’s length, and neither party expects that recommendations will necessarily be based on the buyer’s best interests, or that the buyer will rely on them as such.” The new rule, however, contains no such exception.
2 In the DOL’s eyes, a financial institution that recommends a rollover to a retirement investor can generally expect to earn an ongoing advisory fee or transaction-based compensation from the IRA, whereas it may or may not earn compensation if the assets remain in the ERISA plan.
3 As noted above, the DOL will only treat the marketing of oneself as a “recommendation” if such communication is accompanied by a specific recommendation of a product or service. It is unclear whether the DOL will look for a recommendation of a product or service in fact or in effect, a thorny issue similarly raised under the predecessor 2016 rulemaking.
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) released last week a new class exemption that would provide relief to registered investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks and insurance companies for the receipt of compensation as a result of providing investment advice, including rollover advice, to ERISA-covered plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs). Also included in this rulemaking package is new guidance from the DOL on its recent reinstatement of the traditional five-part test when one becomes an investment advice fiduciary.
Here we provide a brief overview of this significant rulemaking.
Here are the key takeaways:
- Under the DOL’s five-part test, for advice to constitute “investment advice,” a financial institution or investment professional must (1) render advice to the plan as to the value of securities or other property, or make recommendations as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property; (2) on a regular basis; (3) pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement, or understanding with the plan, plan fiduciary, or IRA owner, that; (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan or IRA assets; and that (5) the advice will be individualized based on the particular needs of the plan or IRA. If a financial services firm becomes a fiduciary to a plan under this test, then the resulting compensation from that advice would trigger the prohibited transaction restrictions, necessitating an exemption. While there are currently existing exemptions that can be utilized, they cover discrete transactions, whereas the DOL’s new class exemption applies broadly, similar to how the DOL’s 2016 Best Interest Contract Exemption was designed to function (see below on status of that exemption).
- The DOL indicates that advice to take a distribution of assets from a retirement plan is effectively advice to sell, withdraw, or transfer investment assets currently held in the plan, and, therefore, falls within the definition of fiduciary advice, assuming all five parts of the test are satisfied. DOL’s treatment of most rollover recommendations as investment advice is a departure from its historical position, but pairs well with its 2016 rulemaking and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation Best Interest. Note, however, that the DOL will not pursue claims for breach of fiduciary duty or prohibited transactions based on rollover recommendations made before the effective date of the new final exemption if the recommendations would not have been considered fiduciary communications under the reasoning of the DOL’s historical guidance (i.e., the Deseret Letter).
- The new exemption requires the investment advice to meet the Impartial Conduct Standards, namely: a best interest standard; a reasonable compensation standard; and a requirement to make no materially misleading statements about recommended investment transactions and other relevant matters. The exemption includes disclosure requirements, conflict mitigation, and a compliance review. Prior to engaging in a rollover recommended, financial institutions must provide documentation of the specific reasons for the rollover recommendation to the retirement investor, including the reasons it satisfies the best interest standard. This exemption is partly based upon the temporary enforcement policy announced in Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) 2018-02.
- A financial institution’s reliance on the new exemption also requires it to establish, maintain and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure that they comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards.
- The exemption now includes a self-correction mechanism so that certain technical violations of the exemption’s conditions do not cause the total loss of exemptive relief.
- The exemption does not cover advice arrangements that rely solely on robo-advice; however, the exemption would cover hybrid robo-advice, namely, advice generated by computer models coupled with interaction with an investment professional.
- The DOL’s new rulemaking package removes 2016’s Best Interest Contract Exemption and the Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs. Moreover, pre-existing prohibited transaction class exemptions that had been amended as part of the 2016 rulemaking (e.g., 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-1, 84-24 and 86-128) have been reinstated and published on the DOL’s website in their original form.
- The new exemption will be effective and available to financial institutions beginning 60 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register; however, FAB 2018-02 remains in place for a year to smooth the transition.
Please be on the lookout for our full analysis of this important development after the holidays.